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THE SCIENCE OF INFORMATION PROTECTION 
Daniel F. Warren 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Abstract: The presentation of Information Protection material can be improved in two important ways. First, if the 
material is arranged in a systematic/scientific fashion it can show how all the various pieces fit together 
and it can also demonstrate completeness by showing that all threats are addressed. Second, if each 
protection technique is preceded by a clear description of the threat that it addresses learning is 
significantly enhanced because the protection technique is motivated. This paper presents an 
information threat model that 1) arranges the material in a scientific/systematic fashion and 2) facilitates 
a threat-first presentation of Information Protection techniques. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The threat model presented here is based on the following seven threat classes. These threat 
classes are mutually disjoint and together constitute all threats. 
 
1. The Non-Human threat 
2. The Human Error threat 
3. The Authorized Person threat 
4. The Unauthorized Insider threat 
5. The Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data on the LAN threat 
6. The Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data Outside the LAN threat 
7. The Malicious Software threat 
 
1.1 The following sections describe: 
– why most Information Protection treatments fail to be scientific/systematic, 
– why most Information Protection treatments fail to motivate the material, 
– the nature of the threat model, 
– how the model can be used to arrange Information Protection material in a 
scientific/systematic fashion, 
– how the model facilitates a threat-first presentation of Information Protection techniques and 
– why the classes of the threat model constitute all threats. 
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2. WHY CURRENT INFORMATION PROTECTION TREATMENTS 
FAIL TO BE SCIENTIFIC/SYSTEMATIC 
A recent ad for a new information security book announces that the book covers the following 
major themes: (sub topics are also given for each major theme) 
 
Cryptography, Access Control, Protocols and Software 
A scientific minded reader is bound to ponder: 
• Do these topics cover all facets of Information Protection? 
• What are the relationships between these different themes? 
• Is there a significance to the given order? 
In general, Information Security or Information Protection books present topics in a somewhat 
ad hoc manner that does not lend itself to answering these questions. This, in turn, lessens their 
effectiveness as teaching tools. At a minimum every reader would like to know if an Information 
Protection book covers all aspects of information protection.  
The ability to answer this question and the others posed above requires a systematic approach, 
which is a direct consequence of following the scientific method. The Merriam-Webster on-line 
dictionary1 defines “scientific method” as: 
 
“: principles and procedures for the systematic pursuit of knowledge involving the 
recognition and formulation of a problem, ... ” 
 
The lack of a scientific approach is noteworthy, since, we are, after all, computer scientists. 
The periodic table of elements is a good example of a systematic arrangement of information that 
provides answers to these questions. It does list all currently known elements, it does show the 
relationships between different classes of elements (Alkali metals, Alkali earth metals, Transition 
metals, Rare earth metals, Noble gases and Halogens) and there is a significance to the order of 
elements in the table. 
The result of this systematic arrangement of elements is a framework that facilitates an 
understanding of their properties. 
The threat model presented here systematically arranges the various topics of Information 
Protection. Thus, it facilitates learning in the same way that the periodic table of elements 
facilitates learning. 
3. WHY CURRENT TREATMENTS FAIL TO MOTIVATE THE 
MATERIAL 
Information Protection and First Aid are similar in the sense that they are both 
problem/solution disciplines. If a First Aid course is organized around solutions the approach is 
less than optimal and fails to motivate the material. Such a presentation might start with aspirin 
and describe what aspirins do and what aspirins don’t do. It might then present bandages and 
describe what they do and what they don’t do. And so forth. 
This material is better presented if it is organized around the problems. For acid indigestion do 
this and this and this. For bleeding do this and this and this. And so forth. When presented this 
way the student’s interest is first peaked by the problem. “Hmm, how is acid indigestion 
addressed?” Then when the solution is presented it has context and meaning. The student is 
waiting to hear the solution and is likely to better comprehend it because of the context. 
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Currently most Information Protection books are arranged around solutions, like 
Cryptography, Access Control, Protocols, etc. And often the context is ignored. When execution 
domains are presented how often is the threat that they address also presented? If the student does 
not know what the problem is they are not going to be tuned into the solution. From a 
pedagogical standpoint a better approach is to arrange Information Protection topics around the 
problems and then present the protection techniques that address them. 
Since the threat model introduced here arranges Information Protection material around the 
problems it naturally motivates an engaging presentation of protection techniques. 
4. THE THREAT MODEL 
The threat model presented here is based on a collection of seven threat classes that are 
mutually disjoint and together constitute all threats. These classes are based upon a typical 
enterprise computing situation, like the one shown below. This situation includes two Local Area 
Networks (LANs) that are physically far apart so they communicate via a Wide Area Network 
(WAN), like the Internet. The goal of the enterprise Information Protection policy is to protect 
enterprise information from unauthorized observation, modification and denial of availability and 









Figure 1. Typical Enterprise Computing Environment 
Persons that are authorized to access enterprise information (such as employees) are called 
“insiders.” Persons that are not authorized to access enterprise information are called “outsiders.” 
The LAN systems and network infrastructure are assumed to be protected by typical LAN 
physical and personnel security measures. 
This means that information residing on the LAN systems or on the LAN wired networks does 
not need the same type of protection that is required for information that is residing on systems 
and networks outside the LAN or in a wireless portion of the LAN. 
The model refers to information residing on the LAN systems or on the LAN wired networks 
as “information on the LAN” and information that is residing on systems and networks outside 
the LAN or in a wireless portion of the LAN as “information that is outside the LAN.” 
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The seven threat classes of the model are: 
(1) Non-Human threat 
(2) Human Error threat 
(3) Authorized Person threat 
(4) Unauthorized Insider threat 
(5) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data on the LAN threat 
(6) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data Outside the LAN threat 










Figure 2. Graphical representation of the seven threat classes 
 
Examples threats in each threat class are given below. 
Table 1. Examples of each threat class 
Threat class Example 
(1) Non-Human Fire 
(2) Human Error An employee accidentally deletes a file 
(3) Authorized Person A researcher sells some research data to a competitor 
(4) Unauthorized Insider A mail clerk circumvents the file Access Control mechanisms and obtains some 
research data 
(5) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
on the LAN  
Someone in Iceland breaks into the research computer and obtains research data 
(6) Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
Outside the LAN  
Someone in Florida intercepts microwave traffic and captures enterprise data that is 
flowing across the Internet 
(7) Malicious Software Someone in Iowa plants a Trojan horse in a music sharing program 
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5. HOW THE MODEL SUPPORTS A SCIENTIFIC/SYSTEMATIC 
TREATMENT OF INFORMATION PROTECTION MATERIAL 
The following table lists the threat classes and general categories of protection techniques that 
address each threat class. Viewed this way it is possible to see how the categories of common 
Information Protection techniques (Passwords, ACLs, Firewalls, Cryptography, etc.) fit into the 
big picture of Information Protection. And since these threat classes contain all threats (see 
section 7 for the proof) complete protection against all threats is achieved if each threat class is 
adequately addressed. 
 
Table 2. Categories of protection techniques that address each threat class 
Threat Class General Protection Measures 
Non-Human (1) Physical Security  
 




Authorized Person (3) 
 
Personnel Security 
Personnel Security (background checks) 
Separation of Duties 
Audit 
Unauthorized Insider (4) Operating System Security 
Identification and Authentication 
File Access Control 
Memory Protection (Process Separation, Rings) 
Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
on the LAN (5) 
Perimeter Security 
Firewalls (Network Traffic Access Control) 
Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
Outside the LAN (6) 
Communications Security  
Cryptographic Access Control 
Malicious Software (7) 
 
Malicious Software Security 
Trojan horses: MAC policies 
Worms: Assurance techniques 
Viruses: Ad Hoc Antivirus techniques 
  
Although the assignment of these general categories of protection techniques to the seven 
threat classes is somewhat consistent it is not perfect. For example, parity bits and backup 
systems, which are used to address Non-Human threats, are not Physical Security techniques. 
Similarly, the cryptographic technique of Digital Signatures (which is part of Communications 
Security) is needed to protect the authenticity of message source information against threat 
classes 4 and 5. And particularly noteworthy is the omission of Physical Security as a technique 
for addressing the Unauthorized Insider. If an Insider can get physical access to a server system 
they can access all its data in spite of Operating System Security (I&A, ACLs and Memory 
Protection). They simply steal the hard drive or boot the server off of removable media that 
contains hacking tools. 
These exceptions do not detract from the threat model, though. They simply mean that the 
names of the general categories of protection techniques (Physical Security, Error Security, 
Personnel Security, etc.) that address the classes of the threat model are not perfect. The names 
listed above were selected because most of them are common terms (Physical Security, Personnel 
Security, Perimeter Security, Communications Security) and they are sufficiently correct since 
they encompass most of techniques that are used to address the threat classes. 
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Since many Information Protection measures are based on Access Control there are a few 
supplementary Information Protection techniques that specifically address failures in Access 
Control mechanisms. For completeness the model needs an additional section that contains these 
techniques. 
5.1 Techniques that address failures in Access Control mechanisms 
The table below identifies three techniques that are frequently used to address failures in 
Access Control mechanisms. 
Table 3. Common Techniques for Addressing Access Control Failures 
Access Control Faliures • Design and Development Principles that Promote a Sufficient 
Degree of Assurance 
• Defense in Depth 
• Intrusion Detection 
 
The technique of system Assurance is presented first. When a Web Server program has a 
Buffer Overflow vulnerability that lets an unauthorized user access the system it is a failure in an 
Access Control mechanism. This may seem odd because we generally do not consider a Web 
Server program as part of a system’s Access Control mechanisms. It is, however. Implicitly we 
expect the Web Server program to not grant system access to unauthorized users. This is typically 
not an explicit policy but it is an implicit policy. When such a program does grant an 
unauthorized user system access it is failing to enforce this implicit policy and hence it is an 
instance of a failure in an Access Control mechanism. Thus, design and development techniques 
that promote assurance or trustworthiness in systems address this type of problem. 
Defense in Depth is another technique that can effectively address failures in Access Control 
Mechanisms. In a Defense in Depth strategy more than one protection mechanism is used in 
series to protect an asset. Two Access Control mechanisms are in series if access to an asset 
requires the permission of both mechanisms.  
A Defense in Depth strategy is optimal when failures of the individual the Access Control 
mechanisms are statistically independent events. When this is the case the likelihood of 
concurrent failures in all Access Control mechanisms is the product of the failure rates of each 
individual mechanism. Typically this greatly reduces the overall failure rate. 
Intrusion Detection is another technique that is commonly used to address the problem of 
Access Control failures. In general, Intrusion Detection techniques look for activities that are 
either a result of an Access Control failure or an unauthorized action, such as port probing, that is 
not easily prevented by Access Control techniques. 
6. HOW THE MODEL SUPPORTS A THREAT-FIRST 
PRESENTATION OF INFORMATION PROTECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
A straightforward application of the threat model to the presentation of Information Protection 
material could simply allocate a section or chapter to each threat class, such as is done below. 




Table 4. Applying the Threat Model to the Presentation of Information Protection Material 
Chapters General Information Protection Measures 
1. Non-Human Threat Physical Security 
2. Human Error Threat Error Security 
3. Authorized Person Threat Personnel Security 
4. Unauthorized Insider Threat Operating System Security 
5. Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data on 
the LAN Threat 
Perimeter Security 
6. Outsider Attacking Enterprise Data 
Outside the LAN Threat 
Communications Security 
7. Malicious Software Threat Malicious Software 
8. Access Control Failures Access Control Failure Techniques 
 
In order to instill interest in the student the presentation of each protection technique should 
begin with the threat that is addressed by the protection technique. Chapter 4 above demonstrates 
this well. 
Hypothesize a system with no user Identification capabilities and show how an Insider user 
can access information that they are not authorized to access. 
Hypothesize a system with a user Identification capability and a file access control mechanism 
(e.g., ACLs and ACL program) but no user Authentication capability and show how an Insider 
can access information that they are not authorized to access. 
 
 
Hypothesize a system with user Identification and Authentication and a file access control 
mechanism (e.g., ACLs and ACL program) and  
– consider storing the password information in the clear, 
– consider storing the password information encrypted with conventional cryptography, 
– consider storing the password information in a hashed format. 
– Introduce the Dictionary Attack. 
– Introduce the Brute Force Attack. 
– Go over password selection guidelines 
  
Hypothesize a system with user Identification and Authentication (I&A) and a file access 
control mechanism (e.g., ACLs and ACL program) but no process address space control and 
show how an Insider can directly read and write bytes of memory and access information that 
they are not authorized to access. 
Hypothesize a system with user Identification and Authentication, a file access control 
mechanism (e.g., ACLs and ACL program) and process address space control but no ring 
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mechanism and show how an Insider can bypass the file access controls and ultimately access 
information that they are not authorized to access. 
The conclusion of Chapter 4 is that all aspects of OS Security are necessary to adequately 
address the Insider threat. As previously mentioned, Physical Security also needs to be mentioned 
because it too plays a role in addressing the Insider Threat. 
This arrangement of material is starkly different from what is commonly done today. Most 
treatments today have a chapter on I&A, a chapter on file access control policies and mechanisms 
and a chapter on Operating System Security that presents rings. The arrangement above shows 
that all these techniques work in concert together to address the same threat, which is the 
Unauthorized Insider threat. 
Chapter 7 (Malicious Software Threat) above also demonstrates the value of this approach. 
Since Mandatory Access Control (MAC) policies are primarily implemented to address Trojan 
horse programs in applications it only makes sense to present the threat (Trojan horses) and the 
protection technique (MAC policies) in the same chapter. 
Traditional treatments obscure the connection between MAC policies and Trojan horse 
programs by presenting MAC policies (along with Discretionary Access Control policies) in a 
Policies chapter and Trojan horse programs in a Malicious Software chapter. When presented this 
way the reader has to make the connection between the purpose of a MAC policy and the Trojan 
horse program threat on their own. 
 
7. WHY THE SEVEN CLASSES INCLUDE ALL THREATS 
The follow figures prove that the seven classes of the model do, in fact, include all threats. 
The proof involves repeatedly partitioning the set of all threats until the 7 classes of the model are 
derived. First, the set of All Threats is partitioned into Human-Based threats and Non-Human-




Figure 3. Partitioning all threats into Human and Non-Human-Based threats 
Then the set of Human-Based threats is partitioned into the set of Intentional threats and 
Accidental threats. Intentional threats are, by definition, performed by Untrustworthy Persons. 
With the exception of Non-Human threats (fires, lightening, etc.) and Accidental Errors all threats 






Figure 4. Partitioning Human-Based Threats into Intentional and Accidental Threats 





Human Errors (2) 
Human-Based Non-Human-Based (1) 
All Threats 
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Untrustworthy Persons come in two varieties, those that are authorized to access the data and 
those that are not authorized to access the data. Thus, the set of Untrustworthy Persons is 








Figure 5. Partitioning Untrustworthy persons into Unauthorized and Authorized sets 
Unauthorized Persons come in two varieties, those that are Insiders and those that are 










Figure 6. Partitioning Unauthorized Persons into Outsiders and Insiders 
Outsiders can threaten enterprise data in two different places, in the environment outside the 
LAN or on the LAN. Thus, Outsiders are partitioned accordingly. 
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Figure 7. Partitioning Outsiders into LAN Data Attackers and Non-LAN Data Attackers 
 
A seventh threat class (Malicious Software) is introduced because Unauthorized Insiders and 
Outsiders Attacking Enterprise Data on the LAN can attack LAN information in two ways, 
directly and indirectly. Direct attacks are prevented by appropriate Access Control techniques. 
This is due to the nature of Access Control, it grants access to authorized persons and denies 
access to unauthorized persons and both the Unauthorized Insiders and the Outsiders Attacking 
Data on the LAN are not authorized for the targeted data. 
Indirect attacks are generally not addressed by typical Access Control techniques. 
Indirect attacks use Malicious Software to attack “from the inside.” This type of attack is 
so fundamentally different it is broken out into its own threat class. Access Control 
techniques keep unauthorized users from gaining direct access, they do not prevent a 
victim from unknowingly sending their files to a website in Eastern Europe when they 
execute a Trojan horse program. If the victim is authorized to send data to a website 
Access Control cannot address this problem. 
Outsider Attacking Data 
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Outsider Attacking Data 
on the LAN (5) 
Unauthorized Outsider Unauthorized Insider (4) 
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 Figure 8. Introducing the Malicious Software Threat Class 
Since the seven classes above are derived by partitioning the set of all threats they must 
contain every information threat. As such, adequately addressing each threat class provides 
complete coverage against all threats. 
8. CONCLUSION 
The given threat model provides a systematic way for presenting Information Protection 
topics. Systematic presentations, like the one proposed here, enhance learning by showing how all 
the pieces fit together and by establishing a sense of complete coverage against all threats. The 
use of the threat model presented here also promotes learning because it organizes the material 
around the threats that provides context and necessity for each protection technique. 
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